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LAW AND THE BLOCKCHAIN  
Usha R. Rodrigues* 
 All contracts are necessarily incomplete.  The 
inefficiencies of bargaining over every contingency, 
coupled with humans’ innate bounded rationality, mean 
that contracts cannot anticipate and address every 
potential eventuality.  One role of law is to fill gaps in 
incomplete contracts with default rules.  Emerging 
technologies have created new, yet equally incomplete, 
types of contracts that exist outside of this traditional 
gap-filling legal role.  The blockchain is a distributed 
ledger that allows the cryptographic recording of 
transactions and permits “smart” contracts that self-
execute automatically if their conditions are met.  
Because humans code the contracts of the blockchain, 
gaps in these contracts will arise.  Yet in the world of 
“smart contracting” on the blockchain, there is no place 
for the law to step in to supply default rules—no legal 
intervention point.  The lack of a legal intervention point 
means that law on the blockchain works in a 
fundamentally different way from law in the corporeal 
world.  Business organizational law provides a prime 
example of how the law uses default rules to fill gaps in 
an incomplete contract and how the law works 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2016, a decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) 
launched on Ethereum, a platform that permits layering programs 
called “smart contracts” on top of a cryptocurrency.1  This DAO was 
“decentralized” because no one person or entity controlled it; it was 
“autonomous” because it ran itself, and it was an “organization” of 
a type the world had not seen before.  More of a “virtual venture 
capital fund” than a corporation, the 2016 DAO (as I will term this 
particular DAO) sold tokens in cyberspace that entitled the holders 
to certain voting rights, including the right to vote on proposals for 
projects that the DAO would fund.2   
The 2016 DAO might sound like unintelligible science fiction, but 
businesses organized in the virtual world of the blockchain have 
raised millions of dollars over the past eighteen months.3  For 
purposes of this introduction, all the reader needs to understand is 
that blockchain technology permits “smart contracts” that allow 
coders to layer on top of currency exchanges particular conditions 
under which those exchanges will occur.4  In other words, these 
contracts are self-executing.  The Ethereum blockchain can record 
not only “X paid Y nine ether,” but also “X will pay nine ether Y if 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average reaches 30,000” (ether being the 
unit of cryptocurrency on the Ethereum blockchain).5  These smart 
contracts enabled the 2016 DAO to implement fairly sophisticated 
governance and exit rules autonomously on the blockchain. 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313, 350 (2017) 
(citation omitted). 
 2 dat81, What if the whole world was operated by blockchain?, STEEMIT, https://steemit. 
com/crypto/@dat81/what-if-the-whole-world-was-operated-by-blockchain (last visited Feb. 15, 
2018). 
 3 Giulio Prisco, The DAO Raises More Than $117 Million in World's Largest Crowdfunding 
to Date, BITCOINMAGAZINE (May 16, 2016, 2:09 PM), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/the-
dao-raises-more-than-million-in-world-s-largest-crowdfunding-to-date-1463 422191/.  
 4 Antonio Madeira, The DAO, The Hack, The Soft Fork and The Hard Fork, 
CRYPTOCOMPARE (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.cryptocompare.com/coins/guides/the-dao-the-
hack-the-soft-fork-and-the-hard-fork/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2018). 
 5 The astute reader may wonder how the blockchain knows when the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average reaches 30,000.  This question of how the blockchain receives reliable input from the 
outside world is a key problem blockchain businesses must address.  How do oracle services work 
under the hood?, ETHEREUM STACK EXCHANGE,  https://ethereum.stackexchange.com/ 
questions/11589/how-do-oracle-services-work-under-the-hood (last visited Feb. 24, 2018). 
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The 2016 DAO was enormous success—raising $150 million 
worth of ether in just a few months.6  It was also a tremendous 
failure: because of a flaw in its code, an unknown individual was 
able to siphon about $50 million into a private account, before being 
foiled by a technological fix that unwound the DAO and restored all 
DAO participants’ ether to its original holders.7  Although the 2016 
DAO failed, entrepreneurs following its lead launched 235 initial 
coin offerings (ICOs) in 2017, raising a total of $3.7 billion from the 
public.8   
DAOs may represent a dead-end in the history of business 
organizations—that remains to be seen.9  What matters for the 
purposes of this Article is what the 2016 DAO can tell us about the 
nature of contract law and business law, and the potential for the 
blockchain to upset fundamental expectations about the role of law 
in both fields.  
Academic literature teaches, quite correctly, that all contracts 
are incomplete.10  For one thing, it would be inefficient for two 
parties to try to anticipate each and every future contingency and 
hash out an appropriate contractual response.11 But even if two 
parties were ambitious and patient enough to attempt such a feat, 
it would prove impossible.  Given the bounded rationality of humans 
                                                                                                                   
 6 Antonio Madeira, The DAO, The Hack, The Soft Fork and The Hard Fork, 
CRYPTOCOMPARE (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.cryptocompare.com/coins/guides/the-dao-the-
hack-the-soft-fork-and-the-hard-fork/.  
 7 To be precise, the Ethereum blockchain forked, creating two parallel Ethereum 
blockchains, Ethereum and Ethereum Classic.  On the more popular (and valuable) 
Ethereum, the code was rewritten as if the DAO had not launched.  But in the alternate 
reality of Ethereum Classic, the DAO continues to exist and the $50 million transfer of funds 
did, in fact, occur. Ameer Rosic, What is Ethereum Classic? Ethereum vs Ethereum Classic, 
BLOCKGEEKS.COM, https://blockgeeks.com/guides/what-is-ethereum-classic/ (last visited Feb. 
15, 2018). 
 8 Cryptocurrency ICO Stats 2017, COINSCHEDULE, https://www.coinschedule.com/stats. 
html (last visited Jan. 17, 2017).  Note, however, that not all ICOs are DAOs. 
 9 Although more DAOs are organizing, see infra Part IV.A.2.   
 10 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory 
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 92 (1989). 
 11 Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract 
Design, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 187, 190 (2005) (“A contract is incomplete if it fails to provide 
for the efficient set of obligations in each possible state of the world.”). 
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and the uncertainties of life, one simply cannot contract for every 
future possibility.12   
A key role of contract law is to fill the gaps humans wittingly and 
unwittingly leave in their consensual dealings.13  Much of the 
incomplete-contracting literature deals with how the law should fill 
these gaps.14  Some rules are default rules that the law supplies 
when the parties are silent.15  Others are immutable rules that fix 
certain rights, duties, and obligations regardless of the parties’ 
designs.16  In both cases, the pattern is the same.  Step one: Either 
there is a dispute regarding the interpretation of a term or an 
unforeseen event occurs.  Step two: a court determines what legal 
rule will fill the gap. 
In the blockchain, there is no step two.  Step one occurs as it 
always has.  After all, it is humans who code the contracts of the 
blockchain, and so gaps arise.  But in the blockchain world, step two 
does not occur.  Because the smart “contract” is code alone, there is 
no gap, in the sense of an entry point, for the law to step in to fill.  
Indeed, the case of the blockchain reveals an ambiguity in the 
language that never before created a problem.  The “gap” in an 
incomplete contract is both the topic that the contract never 
explicitly addressed, and the place in the contract where the default 
law steps in to fill the breach.  The blockchain has no gap, in the 
second sense of the term.  Put differently, there is no room, no place 
for default law on the blockchain, unless the blockchain 
affirmatively lets it in.  There is, to use my terminology, no legal 
intervention point. 
This is the case because the DAO organizers made clear that 
their code contained the entire agreement between the participants, 
including all means of enforcement.17  To be sure, that code could 
                                                                                                                   
 12 See Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Incomplete Contracts in A Complete Contract 
World, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 725, 725 (2006) (“Contracts are never fully complete, because 
some contractual incompleteness is inevitable, given the costs of thinking about, bargaining 
over, and drafting for future contingencies.”). 
 13 See generally, Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. at 88-89. 
 17 Bryant Joseph Gilot, Code != Law, MEDIUM (July 4, 2016), https://medium.com/@Crypt 
oIQ.ca/code-law-58b6e39dd626. 
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and did produce problems—bugs, questions of interpretation, call 
them what you will.  Outside the blockchain universe, the parties 
would have dealt with these matters by advancing arguments 
before courts as to which interpretation was the one the parties had 
intended.  A judge would have listened, evaluated both parties’ 
arguments as to the law’s application to the facts at hand, and 
issued a ruling.  On the blockchain, however, there is no such chance 
for law to intervene because by design the code is self-contained.  
Once the code is released into the world, its programmers can no 
longer unilaterally alter it—unless the widely-dispersed, 
anonymous blockchain community can be convinced to do so.  
Because of the decentralized, distributed nature of the blockchain 
ledger, changes in the code will be rejected unless the code itself 
contemplates subsequent modifications.  The only possible legal 
intervention point is not upon the blockchain itself, but rather 
identifiable humans that promote blockchain enterprises and can 
be held liable for their workings. 
This Article is the first to identify and explore the radical 
transformation of the relationship between contract and law that 
the blockchain represents.18  As we will see, the resistance of the 
blockchain to the workings of the law represents both a strength 
and a weakness.  Although the implications of the blockchain for 
general contract law are profound, the bulk of this Article will focus 
its attention on business entities as incomplete contracts.  
Economists and legal academics alike have followed the lead of 
Frank Easterbrook and Dan Fischel in treating the corporation as 
contract,19 and this literature is particularly relevant to the DAO.   
                                                                                                                   
 18 The literature on the blockchain is growing at a rapid clip, but so far has focused on its 
applications.  See David Yermack, Corporate Governance and Blockchains, 21 REVIEW OF 
FINANCE, 7-31, 2017 (examining application of the technology to financial record-keeping); 
Carla L. Reyes, Conceptualizing Cryptolaw, 96 NEB. L. REV. 384 (2017), Kevin Werbach & 
Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313 (2017); Robinson Randolph, The 
New Digital Wild West: Regulating the Explosion of Initial Coin Offerings (Sept. 1, 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3087541, Jonathan Rohr & Aaron 
Wright, Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin Offerings, and the Democratization of 
Public Capital Markets (October 4, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=3048104. 
 19 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989). 
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To illustrate the blockchain’s transformative relationship with 
business association law, we start with a simple observation: 
fundamentally, business association law fills gaps.  Business 
association law supplies default rules that participants tailor to 
their needs.20  This feature explains why U.S. corporate law is often 
described as “enabling” in nature,21 providing relatively few 
mandatory rules.22  But for entities organized purely on the 
blockchain, there are no legal intervention points for default rules 
to fill unless coders affirmatively create them.  There is no space for 
default law has no purchase on the blockchain.23  
The lack of legal intervention point is a double-edged sword.  The 
blockchain grants its entities a power that corporeally organized 
entities do not have—the power to avoid the dangers of partnership 
without resorting to organizational law.24  In the physical world, 
entrepreneurs have every incentive to make use of business 
association law to avoid the partnership form.  While corporations, 
LLCs, and other limited liability entities,25 must file with the state 
and pay fees, there is nothing one need affirmatively do to form a 
partnership.26  All one needs is an “association of two or more 
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit.”27  As 
                                                                                                                   
 20 Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 187-88 (2004). 
 21 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1416, 1417 (1989). 
 22 Id. at 1418. 
 23 As I will explain further in Part IV, I am not claiming that the law should not regulate 
in this space, the “cyber-separatist” position.  See Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, The Shape of 
Governance: Analyzing the World of Internet Regulation, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 605, 619 (2003).  
Instead, I am claiming as a descriptive matter that an entity organized solely on the 
blockchain would not be susceptible to regulation, as long as its corporeal-world organizers 
remained anonymous. 
 24 I prefer the term corporeal world to real-world to distinguish the physical world where 
business associations have traditionally dwelt from the world of the blockchain.  “Real world” 
implies that the blockchain is fake or imaginary.  
 25 See, e.g., Revised Uniform Partnership Act § 202(a) (1997) [hereinafter RUPA]; Delaware 
Limited Liability Company Act § 18-201(a) (2012) [hereinafter DLLCA]. 
 26 E.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 
80, 108 (1991) (“Any company that has not been formally organized under a nonpartnership 
statute could be considered a partnership.”); Paul R. Tremblay, The Ethics of Representing 
Founders, 8 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 267, 276 (2017) (“It is an elementary principle of 
business organizations doctrine that a partnership arises by default, through an ‘association 
of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit . . . whether or not the 
persons intend to form a partnership.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting RUPA § 202(a)). 
 27 RUPA § 202(a). 
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business association casebooks recount, the law is full of 
entrepreneurs who unwittingly form partnerships.28   
The 2016 DAO was an association of two or more individuals to 
carry on as co-owners a business for profit.  It did not formally 
organize under any state’s jurisdiction.  Therefore, under business 
association law it was a partnership, and its tokenholders in theory 
faced unlimited liability.  Also, in theory, the tokenholders’ creditors 
had a claim on the DAO’s assets.  But, as Part III will detail, the 
blockchain is a pseudonymous space, and that pseudonymity, 
coupled with the “code is law”29 nature of the blockchain, provides 
participants a kind of protection unavailable in the real world.  Thus 
the blockchain removes both the penalty and the default from the 
workings of partnership law. The blockchain can, all by itself, 
perform via contractual means what before now only organizational 
law could do.      
But the other edge of the sword remains.  The incomplete 
contracting literature reminds us that all contracts are 
incomplete.30  And so a question arises: When gaps appear in the 
blockchain’s nexus of contracts, what will happen?  The answer to 
that question turns first, as Part IV explains, on the extent to which 
an entity is organized strictly on the blockchain.  If the entity exists 
on the blockchain alone, then the law simply fails—it has no entry 
point into the code.  But as long as identifiable individuals organize 
entities on the blockchain, a legal intervention point does exist—not 
in the blockchain itself, but rather in the intersection of the 
blockchain and the corporeal world.  Sovereign states around the 
globe are grappling with the question of how to regulate the 
blockchain, necessarily focusing on this intersection as a legal 
intervention point.31  Securities law provides a prime example of 
                                                                                                                   
 28 See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith & Cynthia A. Williams, Business Organizations: cases, 
problems, and case studies (3rd ed. 2012). 
 29 Laurence Lessig, Code (2nd ed. 2006), http://codev2.cc/download+remix/Lessig-Codev2. 
pdf. 
 30 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory 
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989). 
 31 Accord Andrew Nelson, Cryptocurrency Regulation in 2018: Where the World Stands 
Right Now, BITCOINMAGAZINE.COM (Feb. 1, 2018, 2:42 PM), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/ar 
ticles/cryptocurrency-regulation-2018-where-world-stands-right-now/. 
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such a legal intervention point on the blockchain—more precisely, 
between the blockchain and the corporeal world.32   
This Article proceeds as follows:  Part I provides an account of 
business associations law as default law and the partnership form 
as the default business organizational form.  It focuses careful 
attention on the various attributes scholars have identified as being 
peculiar to business organizations that affirmatively organize as 
corporations, limited liability companies, and the like: limited 
liability and asset partitioning.  Part II moves to the story of the 
2016 DAO, describing its launch, governance, and the catastrophic 
“hack” which led to its unwinding.  It concludes that, under a 
conventional business law analysis, the 2016 DAO was clearly a 
partnership.  However, Part III describes how the nature of the 
blockchain frustrates the application of conventional business law.  
Indeed, despite their partnership status, entities organized on the 
blockchain itself enjoy de facto limited liability from contract claims, 
and pseudonymity provides at least some protection from the 
currently remote chance of tort claims.  Part IV moves to discuss 
potential legal intervention points.  Purely blockchain 
organizations—with no identifiable human organizers—have no 
legal intervention point, and thus can exist outside the law.  
Nevertheless, DAOs are creating governance structures that 
replicate some of the mandatory and default rules of corporeal law, 
and thus are creating intervention points of their own.  These are 
not legal intervention points, susceptible to governmental action, 
but they are points where private ordering can intervene to fill the 
gaps that arise in the inevitably incomplete contract.  In contrast, 
most ICOs, are currently being launched by identifiable human 
                                                                                                                   
 32 The Securities and Exchange Commission issued a July 2017 report labeling the 2016 DAO 
tokens securities under the Howey test, “a common enterprise with profits derived solely from 
the efforts of others.”  If the tokens are securities, then the DAO’s organizers violated U.S. 
securities laws by conducting a public offering without registering with the SEC or qualifying 
for an exemption from registration. Because the 2016 DAO was unwound, the SEC did not 
prosecute the 2016 DAO organizers.  But the SEC has engaged in subsequent enforcement 
actions.  See SEC Exposes Two Initial Coin Offerings Purportedly Backed by Real Estate and 
Diamonds, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Sept. 29, 2017), https:// 
www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-185-0; Complaint, Securities and Exchange Commission 
v. Plexcorps, et al., CV17-7007,  https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2017/comp-pr2017-
219.pdf; Order, In re Minchee, Inc., (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/ 
33-10445.pdf.https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/33-10 445.pdf. 
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organizers, and the law is quite prominently intervening to shape 
them.     
I.  ORGANIZATIONAL LAW AS A GAP FILLER 
A.  THE FIRM AS AN INCOMPLETE CONTRACT   
This Article will focus on the blockchain’s interaction with the 
default rules supplied by business associations law, but a brief 
review of the more general incomplete-contracting literature is in 
order.  A complete contract would anticipate every possible 
contingency—an impossible feat: “There is an infinite number of 
possible future states and a very large set of possible partner types. 
When the sum of possible states and partner types is infinite and 
contracting is costly, contracts must contain gaps.  Parties cannot 
write contracts about everything.”33  Given that gaps are inevitable, 
the question becomes how best to fill them.  The incomplete-
contracting literature weighs such issues as how to factor in the 
possibility of litigation,34 renegotiation, judicial competence,35 and 
whether gap-filling rules should be “majoritarian” or “penalty 
default” (of which more in a moment).  The focus of this Part, 
however, is on how the incomplete contracting literature relates to 
business forms. 
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel developed a “contractual 
way of looking at the corporation.”36  Their insight is simple and 
profound: the myriad choices that entrepreneurs make when 
structuring a corporation form a web of contracts, both by explicit 
private ordering and by implicit use of the default rules and the 
principles of corporate law.37  This corporation-as-contract 
                                                                                                                   
 33 Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 
YALE L.J. 541, 595 (2003).  
 34 Robert E. Scott, George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE 
L.J. 814, 816 (2006). 
 35 Gillian K. Hadfield, Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of Incomplete Contracts, 
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 159 (1994). 
 36 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1416, 1433 (1989). 
 37 Id. at  1418 (“The corporation is a complex set of explicit and implicit contracts, and 
corporate law enables the participants to select the optimal arrangement for the many 
different sets of risks and opportunities that are available in a large economy.”) . 
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metaphor formed the basis of an influential book, The Economic 
Structure of Corporate Law, in which the authors offered 
justifications for corporate-law doctrine based on economically 
efficient default rules.   
Fiduciary duty offers a familiar example of such a default 
principle.38   Each decision a firm’s executives make impacts the 
value of the firm.  No explicit contract could govern all these 
decisions effectively. Such a contract “would be hopelessly 
incomplete, given the myriad complex decisions that firm managers 
must make in order to run the company. Instead, corporate 
fiduciary duty supplies a general gap-filling standard: firm 
managers should run the firm for shareholders’ benefit.”39    
The bulk of the Economic Structure of Corporate Law analyzes 
other examples of corporate law contractual terms, such as the 
business judgment rule, procedures regarding derivative suits, 
appraisal remedies, laws related to corporate control transactions, 
and more.  Corporate law’s function, in short, is  
a set of terms available off-the-rack so that participants 
in corporate ventures can save the cost of contracting. 
There are lots of terms, such as rules for voting, 
establishing quorums, and so on, that almost everyone 
will want to adopt. Corporate codes and existing judicial 
decisions supply these terms “for free” to every 
corporation, enabling the venturers to concentrate on 
matters that are specific to their undertaking. Even 
when they work through all the issues they expect will 
arise, they are apt to miss something. All sorts of 
complexities will arise later. Corporate law-and in 
particular the fiduciary principle enforced by courts-
fills in the blanks and oversights with the terms that 
people would have bargained for had they anticipated 
                                                                                                                   
 38 Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 201 (2004). 
 39 Frederick Tung, Gap Filling in the Zone of Insolvency, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 607, 612 
(2007).  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3127782 
12 LAW AND THE BLOCKCHAIN  [Vol. XX:1 
 
the problems and been able to transact costlessly in 
advance.40  
In sum, corporate law fills the gaps of the necessarily incomplete 
contract of the corporation. 
But the firm need not necessarily take the corporate form.  For 
the metaphor of the firm as a nexus-of-contracts to apply, a 
corporation need not be at its center.  As Easterbrook and Fischel 
point out, the first choice entrepreneurs make is to select a business 
form.41  Today’s would-be entrepreneurs face a relatively settled 
menu of firm choices: the partnership, the corporation, the limited 
partnership, the limited liability partnership, the limited liability 
company (LLC) and, more recently, the benefit corporation and its 
cousins.42  These forms are not all created equal.  The default 
organizations rules have always tilted in favor of the limited 
liability forms, and against the partnership.43  Indeed, the law uses 
default rules to push entrepreneurs to the limited liability entity 
forms.44  Easterbrook and Fischel urged that these gap-fillers those 
forms afford are useful, but other scholars have made a more 
emphatic argument for them: only organizational law can create 
impermeable barriers to protect the firm’ participants from claims 
outside the firm.45   
To understand the penalty default nature of the partnership 
form, one should start with a basic observation: In order to form a 
limited liability entity like a corporation or LLC, entrepreneurs 
must file required paperwork and pay a fee to the state under whose 
laws they intend to organize.46  Once the entrepreneur receives 
                                                                                                                   
 40 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1416, 1444–45 (1989). 
 41 Id. at 1417 (“Consider the domain of choice. The founders and managers of a firm choose 
whether to organize as a corporation, trust, partnership, mutual or cooperative.”). 
 42 The flexible purpose corporation and L3C.  Margaret M. Blair, Reforming Corporate 
Governance: What History Can Teach Us, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 19 (2004). 
 43 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 89 (1985). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 
YALE L.J. 387 (2000). 
 46 See, e.g., Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act § 201(a) (2012) [hereinafter 
RULLCA]; DLLCA § 18-201(a). 
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confirmation of a successful filing, the limited liability entity is 
formed.47  In contrast, the partnership, “probably the oldest form of 
business organization,”48 does not require any official filing with a 
government entity or agency.  All that the Revised Uniform 
Partnership Act requires for partnership formation is “the 
association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a 
business for profit.”49   Parties can create partnerships without even 
intending to do so.50  Law school casebooks for the Business 
Associations course generally feature the story of hapless partners 
who formed a partnership without even knowing that they had done 
so.51  All two people need to do is carry on as co-owners a business 
for profit—they need not even utter the words “partner” or 
“partnership” to be treated as such by the law.52  Thus, the general 
partnership is the default form.53   
What’s more, the default form is unstable and porous, bringing 
with it considerable risks both to the individual and to the entity 
itself.  The partnership form offers unlimited liability, meaning that 
the firm’s creditors can reach the assets of its owners.54  While a 
corporation’s shareholder can lose the full amount of her 
investment, her losses are capped at that amount.55  In contrast, a 
                                                                                                                   
 47 See, e.g., 8 Del. C. § 103. 
 48 Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business 
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 409 (2003) (citing Robert W. 
Hillman, Private Ordering Within Partnerships, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 428 (1987)).  
 49 RUPA § 202(a). 
 50 For example, the receipt of profits raises a presumption of partnership under RUPA § 
202(c)(3). 
 51 See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith & Cynthia A. Williams, Business Organizations: cases, 
problems, and case studies (3rd ed. 2012). 
 52 See supra note 49.  
 53 E.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 
80, 108 (1991) (“Any company that has not been formally organized under a nonpartnership 
statute could be considered a partnership.”); Paul R. Tremblay, The Ethics of Representing 
Founders, 8 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 267, 276 (2017) (“It is an elementary principle of 
business organizations doctrine that a partnership arises by default, through an ‘association 
of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit . . . whether or not the 
persons intend to form a partnership.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting RUPA § 202(a)). 
 54 RUPA § 306; Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 192 (2004). 
 55 Setting aside the risk of the corporate veil being pierced, a relatively rare occurrence 
when the corporate form is not sufficiently respected.  Frank H. Easterbrook, Limited 
Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985) (“Courts occasionally allow 
creditors to ‘pierce the corporate veil,’ which means that shareholders must satisfy creditors’ 
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partner of a general partnership can invest only $1,000, yet risks 
being jointly and severally liable for the full amount of the 
partnership’s losses.56 
General partnerships are also fragile creatures.  The voluntary 
exit of a single partner triggers dissolution of the entire 
partnership.57  Even worse, the creditors of any individual owner 
have a claim on the firm’s assets as well—and traditionally can 
trigger dissolution to liquidate them.58 The only protection the 
partnership form offers its partners is “weak entity shielding”: firm 
creditors have priority in the partnership assets over the personal 
creditors.59  Still, the personal creditors of investors do have a claim 
on partnership assets, and have the power to dissolve the firm 
entirely.60  Contracting to protect the firm from the claims of 
individual partners’ creditors was difficult in practice because of 
moral hazard.61 
The partnership form offers other default rules that differ greatly 
from the more familiar corporate framework.  For example, the 
default partnership governance structure allots to each and every 
partner an equal vote—whether they contribute $100 or 
$1,000,000.62  Majority vote governs ordinary partnership decisions, 
and a unanimous vote is required for extraordinary ones.63  One’s 
investment in a partnership is not freely transferable—a partner 
                                                                                                                   
claims. ‘Piercing’ seems to happen freakishly. Like lightning, it is rare, severe, and 
unprincipled.”). 
 56 While it is true that partnerships also enjoy the benefit of pass-through taxation, this 
feature provides small comfort when one considers that the LLC form can furnish the same 
benefit while affording limited liability and asset segregation to boot. 
 57 RUPA § 801. 
 58 Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1339 (2006). 
 59 Id. at 1337-38. 
 60 Id. at 1391.  Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, this liquidation right is 
transformed into a mandatory buyout, where the creditors can require the firm to buy out the 
bankruptcy partner’s interest.  RUPA §§ 401(h), 701.  See also Uniform Partnership Act § 
18(e) [hereinafter UPA].  
 61 RUPA § 701.  In theory, each partner could negotiate a waiver preventing each of his or 
her personal creditors from recourse to the partnership, but each individual partner would 
be tempted to omit the waiver in order to lower the cost of credit. Henry Hansmann, Reinier 
Kraakman, & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1340-
41 (2006). 
 62 UPA § 9; RUPA § 401. 
 63 UPA § 9; RUPA § 401. 
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may only sell her share with the consent of all other partners.64  
While these rules may be unpalatable, parties can contract around 
them with relative ease.  Those unsuspecting partners in the 
casebooks serve as cautionary tales to aspiring lawyers and 
entrepreneurs because of the two big risks partners cannot contract 
out of: unlimited liability and inherent entity instability. 
The limited liability forms (and for simplicity’s sake, I will use 
the corporate form as a stand-in for all of these forms) in contrast, 
mean more protection and stability than a partnership can afford.  
Most notably, the corporate form offers limited liability: while 
owners of these forms may lose money, their losses are capped at 
the amount they have invested in the firm.65  Their personal assets 
are not “on the hook,” as they are in the partnership form.  
Conversely, while a bankrupt shareholder will have to surrender 
her shares to her personal creditors, those creditors will have no 
recourse or rights with respect to the corporation itself.66      
We can thus call the fact that the law supplies partnership as the 
default business organizational form a “penalty default” rule.  The 
question as to what kind of default rules the law should supply to 
fill the gaps in incomplete contracts is a crucial one.  Easterbrook 
and Fischel argued for majoritarian gap rules that supply terms 
that the parties would generally have bargained for had they 
considered a particular eventuality.67  The term “penalty default 
rules,” which was coined by Ayres and Gertner, denotes gap-filling 
rules that, rather than follow majoritarian preferences, impose 
penalties.68  In theory, the specter of this penalty motivates the 
                                                                                                                   
 64 RUPA § 401. 
 65 See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 189 (2004); 6 
Del. C. § 18-303. While the LLC and other new forms also offer many of these features, for 
the sake of simplicity I focus solely on the corporate form.  
 66 Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1340 (2006).  As an example of other attractive features of corporate 
law, in the corporate form, management is centralized in a board of directors. Larry E. 
Ribstein, Why Corporations, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 188 (2004).  Shares are freely 
transferable, and the death or exit of its owners does not dissolve the corporation. Larry E. 
Ribstein, Why Corporations, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 189 (2004) 
 67 Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 187-88 (2004). 
 68 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory 
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989). 
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affected party to affirmatively state her preference, for fear of 
otherwise living with the penalty the law supplies. 
Couple the many negative, or at least counter-intuitive features 
of partnership law, plus the fact that it is the default business 
association form, and we can characterize the partnership as a 
species of penalty default rule—a penalty default business form, if 
you will.  A trap for the unwary, it incentivizes people to 
affirmatively make their preferences—for limited liability, entity 
stability, or voting rules—known by opting into a limited liability 
form.  Indeed, in a piece defending the existence of penalty default 
rules in real life, Ayres himself referred to the partnership as a 
species of penalty default:  
[I]t is possible to understand the general partnership as 
a “penalty default.”  That is, many, if not most, 
organizers of business firms may prefer characteristics 
that cannot be achieved through a general partnership; 
the structure of general partnership law creates 
incentives to choose other organizational forms.69 
To the extent that partnership law offers entrepreneurs a penalty 
default, they can opt out of it in two different ways.  First, there are 
certain default partnership rules—such as, for example, the 
democratic one-partner-one-vote rule—that they can contract out of 
amongst themselves.70  But there are partnership features that one 
can only obtain, or most cheaply obtain, by way of adopting one of 
the limited liability forms.71   
Indeed, as corporate law scholarship in the 1980s and 1990s 
came to be dominated by the nexus of contracts metaphor,72 
corporate law scholars searched for the raison d’etre of the business 
                                                                                                                   
 69 Ian Ayres, Ya-Huh: There Are and Should Be Penalty Defaults, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
589, 604–05 (2006) (alteration in original) (citing Deborah A. DeMott, Transatlantic 
Perspectives on Partnership Law: Risk and Instability, 26 J. CORP. L. 879 (2001)).  
 70 Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1392 (2006). 
 71 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 
YALE L.J. 387, 429 (2000). 
 72 William W. Bratton, Jr., Nexus of Contracts Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 
CORNELL L. REV. 407, 409 (1989) (“This notion has achieved wide currency, showing up even 
in contexts in which the rest of the theory has little or no influence.”). 
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entity.  This question arises anew when we confront the blockchain’s 
world of self-enforcing contracts.  Before approaching that question, 
background on the debate about what, if anything, corporate law 
provides that contract alone cannot will provide context for an 
appreciation of the unique promise of the blockchain for business 
associations.  
Corporate and business law scholars have written extensively on 
different characteristics of the corporate form, each trying to 
identify the essential function of organization law.73  These scholars 
have articulated important theories, arguing that there are unique 
features of entity law in general, and corporate law in particular 
that cannot be replicated by contract alone.74  
The main contenders for the “difference” of corporate law are 
partitioning of assets, and limited liability.75  These functions, it is 
argued, cannot be achieved except through the corporate form.76 
Interestingly, all of these theories require entity form not for the 
purposes of those inside the entity—who can presumably deal with 
their concerns via contract.  Instead, it is the threat of those outside 
the firm, who cannot be reliably bound by contract that necessitates 
the corporate form.77 The common thread in all of these 
justifications for the uniqueness of the corporate form is a basic 
limitation of traditional organizational law: it cannot reliably bind 
intra-firm assets for the protection of outside creditors, walling 
them off from the claims of its owners’ creditors (entity shielding, a 
form of asset partitioning).78  Nor can it reliably protect investor-
owners from the claims of the firm’s own creditors’ claims (limited 
liability).79  Nor can it dependably safeguard the firm assets against 
liquidation, either voluntarily from one of the owners or 
involuntarily at the behest of an owner’s creditors (lock-in).80  
                                                                                                                   
 73 See generally, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of 
Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000). 
 74 Id. at 435. 
 75 Id. at 433. 
 76 Id. at 432-35. 
 77 Id. at 433. 
 78 Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1337 (2006). 
 79 Id. at 1340. 
 80 Id.  
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Corporate law alone can shield assets and aggregate claims in the 
way necessary to facilitate capital formation and growth.81   
Because the blockchain offers a self-enforcing contract that 
credibly binds and segregates assets, it has the potential to solve 
the problems of asset-partitioning and limited liability by means of 
contract alone.  By laying bare all of its contracts on the blockchain, 
it drastically reduces the risk that third parties from outside the 
firm can make claims upon it.  This transparency represents its 
challenge to business associations law: it can use contract to provide 
corporate-like functions in a new way.  It is also nearly impervious 
to the default-supplying function that is so basic to business 
associations law, but that holds as much in the way of problem as 
in the way of promise. Before we can explore the general default 
function of business association law, however, let’s review the 
different features of the corporate form scholars have identified as 
irreplicable by contractual means alone. 
1.  Limited Liability.  Traditionally, the corporation’s chief virtue 
was seen to lie in the unique protection against liability that it 
provides for shareholders.82  Protecting the corporation’s owners 
from its debts was an innovation designed to entice wary outside 
investors to risk their capital in new ventures.  In the partnership 
form, investors were on the hook for any and all of the corporation’s 
debts.  In contrast, the corporation’s limited liability protections 
effectively capped investor losses at the amount of capital 
invested.83  
                                                                                                                   
 81 Notably, the partnership form’s drawbacks are the mirror image of features posited as 
the defining characteristics of the corporate form: 1) the partnership’s creditors can reach the 
assets of its partner owners; 2) the individual partners’ creditors can reach the assets of the 
firm, to the point of liquidating it, and 3) any partner’s exit can force liquidation. Margaret 
M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the 
Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 409-12 (2003). 
 82 Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 193 (2004) (“Thus, it 
has been said that ‘limitation or elimination of liability of the shareholders is not merely the 
chief single advantage of a business corporation but it is the advantage which in the 
estimation of legislatures and also in the estimation of the public is of more importance than 
all the other advantages put together. It is the main thing.’”) (citation omitted). 
 83 Id. at 192. 
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While limited liability is traditionally viewed as a chief attraction 
of the corporate form, some scholars have questioned this premise.84  
At first blush, it might seem that because contract law is essentially 
enforceable only between the two contracting parties, the 
contractual relationship on its own cannot shield a party from the 
claims of the creditors of its counterparty.85 The limited liability 
provided by the corporate form, via the asset partitioning 
mechanism, alone can provide a wall that shields the corporation’s 
shareholders from corporate creditors and the corporation from its 
shareholders’ creditors.86  Yet unlike entity shielding, owner 
shielding can be obtained via contract “by requiring firm agents 
(including the owners themselves when they act on behalf of the 
firm) to negotiate clauses in the firm's contracts whereby firm 
creditors agree to limit or waive their right to levy on the owners’ 
personal assets.”87  
Such contractual provisions would, however, be ineffective with 
respect to tort claims against the firm. Tort claimants by definition 
are free from any contractual limitation on their power to levy on 
the firm investor assets (because tort victims do not generally 
anticipate falling victim to future torts, particularly those inflicted 
upon them by specific tortfeasors).88  Tort claimants thus would 
remain a constant threat for businesses that choose not to use the 
corporate form.89  As a result, only business associations law, by 
                                                                                                                   
 84 Margaret Blair offers a historically based critique of the proposition that limited liability 
is the defining characteristic of the corporate form, observing that: “Although limited liability 
became one of the defining characteristics of the corporate form in the early and mid-
twentieth century, many early corporations were organized under charters that did not grant 
limited liability.” Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for 
Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 437 (2003). 
 85 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 
YALE L.J. 387, 407 (2000). 
 86 Id. 
 87 Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1341 (2006). Firm owners can enhance the effectiveness of this 
strategy by using a term such as “limited” in the firm’s name to signal clearly to third parties 
that firm agents act without the authority to bind the owners’ personal assets. Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 
387, 430 (2000). 
 88 Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 193 (2004). 
 89 John Morley has argued that, as a historical matter, this theoretical vulnerability to tort 
claims had little practical effect because “[t]ort liability was extremely rare prior to the mid-
nineteenth century, and the doctrines of tort law remained poorly developed up through at 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3127782 
20 LAW AND THE BLOCKCHAIN  [Vol. XX:1 
 
providing state-provided limitation of liability from both a firm’s 
tort creditors and its contract creditors, affords entrepreneurs with 
indemnity from losses in excess of initial investments.90   
While limited liability or “owner shielding” focuses on the risk 
that the entity’s liabilities pose to investors, another candidate for 
the key defining characteristic of corporate law flips that rationale 
on its head.  It focuses not on the risks that the debts of the entity 
pose to its owners, but instead on the risks that the debts of 
individual owners pose to the entity itself. 
2.  Asset Partitioning.  Several scholars have focused on the 
corporate form’s unique ability to insulate firm assets from the 
claims of the investors’ creditors.  In particular, Hansmann, 
Kraakman and Squire deem this characteristic of the corporate 
form to be a feature contract law cannot replicate.91  Triantis 
highlights the ability of the firm to match, by means of subsidiaries, 
particular assets to the claims of particular creditors.92  And Blair 
focuses on the fact that, historically, only the corporate form allowed 
for permanence from claims within and outside the firm.93   
According to Hansmann, Kraakman, and Squire the “universal 
characteristic” of modern business firms is “entity shielding,”94 that 
is, “the legal power to commit assets that bond their agreements 
with their creditors and, correlatively, to shield those assets from 
                                                                                                                   
least the early twentieth century.  John Morley, The Common Law Corporation: The Power 
of the Trust in Anglo-American Business History, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 2145, 2182 (2016) 
(citations omitted).  He similarly discounts potential entity tax liability as a threat to would-
be owners: “Tax liability was also relatively insignificant. Although the United Kingdom 
adopted a corporate income tax in 1803, its rates remained low for at least a century. And the 
United States did not successfully tax corporate income until 1909—even then, the rates were 
very low by modern standards.”  Id. 
 90 Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 193 (2004). 
 91 See generally, Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, & Richard Squire, Law and the 
Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1335 (2006). 
 92 George G. Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal Boundaries of 
Firms, Collateral, and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
1102, 1106 (2004). 
 93 Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business 
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 429 (2003). 
 94 Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1336 (2006) (replacing the earlier (and clunkier) “affirmative asset 
partitioning” Hansmann and Kraakman used in their prior article, The Essential Role of 
Organizational Law) (citing Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of 
Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 393-95 (2000)). 
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the claims of their owners’ personal creditors.”95  These scholars 
deem it “practically impossible” to use contract to create effective 
entity shielding because each owner would have to require his or 
her personal creditors to waive any claims on firm assets.96  If each 
partner were to negotiate a waiver in all contracts with each of his 
or her personal creditors, then in theory contractual entity shielding 
might be possible.  But such a solution would entail not only high 
transaction costs but also, and more importantly, impose a high 
degree of moral hazard.97  In particular, while having these waivers 
in place would benefit firm owners collectively by reducing 
borrowing costs, “each waiver would also increase personal 
borrowing costs, and that cost would be borne entirely by the owner 
who negotiated the waiver.  Each owner would thus face an 
incentive to act opportunistically by omitting the waivers from 
personal dealings.”98  Policing the omission of such waivers would 
prove difficult, particularly as the number of owners increases.  
“The policing problem is further compounded if ownership shares 
are freely transferable.  These problems can be solved only by 
impairing the rights of personal creditors without their contractual 
consent (and often even without notice).  Doing that requires a 
special rule of property law for assets committed to the firm.”99 They 
conclude that “[e]ntity law provides that rule.”100  Thus, Hansmann, 
Kraakman, and Squire conclude that it is entity shielding, not 
owner shielding that is the “sine qua non” of the legal entity.101 
Another scholar, George Triantis, focuses on other aspects of 
asset partitioning as unique to the corporate form.  He posits that 
corporate law functions to demarcate firm boundaries.102  According 
to him, internal capital markets increase the flexibility and 
discretion of corporate managers to allocate capital between 
projects, and the corporate form’s ability to separate these internal 
                                                                                                                   
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 1340. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at 1340-41. 
 100 Id. at 1341. 
 101 Id. at 1338. 
 102 See generally, George G. Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal 
Boundaries of Firms, Collateral, and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 1102, 1102 (2004). 
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capital markets into distinct entities via subsidiaries creates 
“barriers to capital movements across the boundaries of such 
entities, even when they are subject to common control.”103  The 
corporate form alone can create these durable divisions in the 
corporate family.  
Finally, Margaret Blair argues that the corporation’s unique 
ability to lock in capital is what sets it apart as a historical matter, 
“When a corporation is formed, initial investors not only commit a 
pool of capital to be used in the business, but they also yield control 
over the business assets and activities to a board of directors that is 
legally independent of both shareholders and managers.”104  Blair 
argues that this surrender of legal control rights by equity investors 
and other corporate participants facilitates efficient team 
production.105  The general partnership form, in contrast, is 
inherently unstable because the voluntary exit of any individual 
triggers the dissolution of the firm.106   
3.  Exceptions that Prove the Rule.  Thus far, I have characterized 
the partnership form is a kind of penalty-default organizational 
form, that the existence of which serves to motivate entrepreneurs 
to opt for other business forms.  Historically, this penalty default 
has forced firms into a corporate-like form, illustrating the limits of 
contract alone.  Scholars like Hansmann, Kraakman, Squire, 
Triantis, and Blair have asserted various theories for what 
characteristic makes limited liability entities special, and the main 
contenders are limited liability, entity shielding and asset 
segregation.107  Two scholars have recently challenged this 
narrative.   
Looking back in time, John Morley recently made the case for the 
trust as an early—and still viable—alternative to the corporate 
form in American legal history.  According to Morley, the trust form 
resembles the corporation because it approximates the innovative 
“legal technologies” of limited liability, legal personhood, and the 
                                                                                                                   
 103 Id. at 1106. 
 104 Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business 
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 393 (2003). 
 105 Id.  
 106 See supra note 57. 
 107 See supra notes 60-71. 
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opportunity to create tradable shares.108  We have seen that the 
entity shielding provided by the corporate form prevents the owners’ 
creditors from forcing the entity to liquidate.109  In similar fashion, 
the trust protects the trust’s beneficiaries from instability because 
they transfer title of their property to the trust.110  A borrower’s 
creditor only has claims on the borrower’s property, and if title of 
Blackacre has passed to a trust, it is shielded from the borrower’s 
creditors because it is no longer technically the borrower’s property 
at all.111  This ancient and relatively simple mechanism is thus able 
to provide entity shielding. Finally, the law evolved to give trust 
beneficiaries limited liability from the claims of trust creditors and 
other corporate-like features.112  The main point for our purposes is 
that the non-corporate form of the trust for centuries has exhibited 
many of the supposedly unique features of the corporation.  
Another modern business firm—the reciprocal insurance 
exchange—fits the same mold.  Andrew Verstein has described this 
business structure as an example of “enterprise without entity.”113  
A reciprocal exchange is “an insurance enterprise in which all 
insurance subscribers contract directly with one another, promising 
to pay a share of any losses the others suffer.”114  The unique world 
of the reciprocal exchange provides “no legal entity at the 
contractual core.”115   Instead, “[a] thick braid of contracts unites a 
circle of natural persons, each of whom participates as part of the 
enterprise.”116  Verstein argues that reciprocals have used a 
combination of contract law and insurance regulation to achieve 
asset partitioning.117   
                                                                                                                   
 108 John Morley, The Common Law Corporation: The Power of the Trust in Anglo-American 
Business History, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 2145, 2148 (2016). 
 109 Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1391 (2006). 
 110 See supra note 108, at 2154. 
 111 See supra note 108, at 2169. 
 112 See supra note 108, at 2176-77.  While trustees, the central governing body of the trust, 
did sometimes face liability, so did contemporaneous corporate directors.  See supra note 108, 
at 2180. 
 113 See generally Andrew Verstein, Enterprise Without Entities, 116 MICH. L. REV. 247, 247 
(2017). 
 114 Id. at 249. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 251. 
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Perhaps these examples teach us that claims to corporate law 
exceptionalism are, like Twain’s death, greatly exaggerated.118  On 
the other hand, these examples may prove the rule.  Although the 
“essential” corporate law features may be subject to duplication, the 
real-world use of trusts and reciprocal exchanges to achieve these 
goals is rare.  In general, to avoid the penalty default of partnership, 
entrepreneurs of have long opted for limited liability entities.119  
But a new technology, the blockchain, offers the potential to 
change that.  And critical steps in that direction have already taken 
place. 
II.  THE 2016 DAO 
This Part shifts attention to the blockchain, including by will 
describing the 2016 DAO’s rise and fall in considerable detail.  The 
story is fascinating in its own right, but its importance for this 
Article is twofold.  First, it demonstrates the potential for business 
associations to exist on the blockchain, using smart contracts to 
effectuate the functions of business law.  Without the constraints 
imposed by ordinary legal rules, DAOs can structure contractual 
relations in a way impossible in the corporeal world, unfettered by 
partnership penalty default the law would otherwise impose.  But 
the story of the DAO also demonstrates, in vivid manner, the peril 
of smart contracting.  All contracts are necessarily incomplete.120  
The 2016 DAO is a cautionary tale about the limits of relying on a 
“code is law” model when (as inevitably happens) gaps in the nexus 
of contracts emerge without a legal intervention point on which the 
law can work.  
A.  BACKGROUND 
Blockchain technology, also called distributed ledger technology, 
offers four primary and related benefits: it is decentralized, it is 
                                                                                                                   
 118 Laura I. Appleman, Reports of Batson’s Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated: How the 
Batson Doctrine Enforces A Normative Framework of Legal Ethics, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 607, 657 
(2005). 
 119 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory 
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989). 
 120 Id. 
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transparent, it is (or at least can be) anonymous, and it is nearly 
impossible to manipulate.121  Ledgers are an ancient method of 
recording transactions—think clay tablets or papyrus.122  
Distributed ledgers are a record-keeping device that exist across a 
large, shared network.123  Each network participant’s computer (or 
node) stores a copy of the ledger, which is simultaneously updated 
across the network whenever any change occurs.124  This 
“distribution” is a key differentiator from typical “fiat” currency, 
where a single trusted authority validates each transaction.125  
Instead of a central authority authenticating and communicating 
transactions, each of the nodes independently verifies proposed 
additions to the ledger, or blockchain.126  If a majority of the nodes 
verify the transaction, it is added to the blockchain.127      
Bitcoin, the first widely publicized blockchain, was simply a 
virtual currency, facilitating simple purchases between parties.128  
But the next generation of blockchains were developed to layer 
“smart contracts” on top of the virtual currencies they offered.129  
Ethereum is a prominent example of such a “smart contract” 
blockchain that uses “ether” as a unit of currency.130  The Ethereum 
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blockchain permits the central recording not just of an exchange, 
but of contractual conditions and limits on the circumstances under 
which an exchange can occur.131  Indeed, while Bitcoin was designed 
intentionally as a crypto-currency, Ethereum was created 
specifically for users to develop new app designs to layer on top of 
its blockchain to facilitate smart contracts.132 
The concept of a “smart contract” merits close attention. As a 
historical matter, a contract is a promise that can be legally 
enforced.133  First-year contracts students learn the difference 
between promised gifts, promises that are enforceable because 
supported by consideration.  In contrast, a “smart contract” is one 
as to which enforcement is automatic, and does not depend on the 
law for enforcement.134  These contracts need not be high-tech—
Szabo, who first coined the term, used as his example the vending 
machine.135  On blockchains like Ethereum, a “smart contract” 
generates an automatically enforceable promise,136 but one 
available without recourse to the law. 
One of Ethereum’s founders participated in an ambitious effort 
to use Ethereum’s blockchain to create a business organization—
although a business organization unlike any other.137  He called it a 
“decentralized autonomous organization,” or DAO.138  In general, 
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DAOs build upon two other concepts—autonomous agents and 
decentralized organizations.  
[I]n an autonomous agent, there is no necessary specific 
human involvement at all . . . while some degree of 
human effort might be necessary to build the hardware 
that the agent runs on, there is no need for any humans 
to exist that are aware of the agent’s existence. . . . One 
example of an autonomous agent that already exists 
today would be a computer virus.139   
Decentralized organizations are intended to replace corporate 
organizations: 
Instead of a hierarchical structure managed by a set of 
humans interacting in person and controlling property 
via the legal system, a decentralized organization 
involves a set of humans interacting with each other 
according to a protocol specified in code, and enforced 
on the blockchain.  A D[A]O may or may not make use 
of the legal system for some protection of its physical 
property, but even there such usage is secondary.140   
The first DAO launched on April 30, 2016 (“2016 DAO”).141  Its 
central idea, articulated in a white paper authored by Slock.it Chief 
Technology Officer Christoph Jentzsch,142 was to establish an 
“automated investment fund.”143  This began the 28-day “Creation” 
phase, or funding phase.144  During this phase “investors” could 
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send ether to the 2016 DAO’s account on Ethereum, with early 
investors receiving more tokens for their ether than subsequent 
investors.145  The 2016 DAO then converted ether to DAO tokens,146 
which were “divisible, indistinguishable” and “freely 
transferable.”147  The 2016 DAO initial offering was a tremendous 
success.  It raised over $150 million, attracting almost 14% of all 
ether tokens then in existence.148 
The DAO’s organizers took great pains to ensure that it was, in 
fact, decentralized.  The DAO’s token creation code was open source 
code, where anyone could copy or modify the original code, and it 
was written by the Slock.it team.149  Due to concerns over the 
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creation of a centralized system, “the Slock.it team got behind an 
effort to release the code to the wild and thus facilitate the 
possibility of a “pure DAO” rather than a Slock.it DAO. . . . A Slock.it 
DAO would not have been a “true” DAO as it would have been 
excessively centralized.”150 
Integral to the promise of the 2016 DAO was that it was truly an 
autonomous organization.  Taking as a guide Lessig’s famous 
precept that “the code is the law,”151 the organizers envisioned a 
world where, once the 2016 DAO was up and running, it would 
continue without any modifications.  Its website stated “The terms 
of The DAO Creation are set forth in the smart contract code 
existing on the Ethereum blockchain at 0xbb9bc244d798123fde783 
fcc1c72d3bb8c189413.  Nothing in this explanation of terms or in 
any other document or communication may modify or add any 
additional obligations or guarantees beyond those set forth in The 
DAO’s code.”152  In the film version of this article, cue the foreboding 
music. 
B.  GOVERNANCE OF THE 2016 DAO  
Tokens gave DAO tokenholders both ownership and property 
rights.153  Much as in the corporate form, each token represented 
voting power, and thus the holder of more tokens had a larger say 
in governance than the holder of fewer tokens (as opposed to the 
default one-partner, one-vote apportionment of the partnership 
form).154  The primary voting function was anticipated to be for 
specific proposals, to be funded with the ether the DAO held.155   
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While the proponents of the DAO point to its decentralized 
nature, the structure of the DAO itself was projected to make use of 
“curators” and “contractors.”156  Curators were to control the 
addition of smart contracts, or project proposals, to the DAO by 
contractors, who would complete the approved project proposals in 
exchange for ether from the DAO.157  Any tokenholder could submit 
a proposal to become a contractor for the 2016 DAO by writing a 
smart contract and publishing it on the blockchain, and describing 
its details on the DAO website.158  Additionally, it had to pay an 
ether deposit that it would forfeit if the proposal failed to achieve a 
quorum of tokenholders.159       An early proposal, from the Slock.it 
team itself, to create a physical lock that can be opened remotely, to 
allow Airbnb style access to homes for rent.160   
After submitting a proposal, the aspiring contractor would wait 
for a curator to verify that any contract code submitted by a 
prospective contractor did in fact match the contract as published 
on the blockchain, and to verify that the proposal came from an 
identified person or organization.161  Curators thus controlled the 
addition of smart contracts, or project proposals, to the 2016 DAO 
by contractors. The curators controlled the whitelist of those 
contractors authorized to receive ether from the DAO.  The 2016 
DAO boasted of having as curators “the best and brightest 
developers at Ethereum.”162 
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After being approved by a curator for the whitelist, a debate 
period of a minimum of two weeks would allow for the community 
to debate and vote on the proposal.163  After the debate period 
concluded, any tokenholder could require the DAO to verify that 
quorum was reached and a majority of votes were cast in favor of 
the proposal.164  If a tokenholder disagreed with a proposal of the 
DAO, he or she would vote against the proposal.165   
The role of the curators in the 2016 DAO was controversial, and 
subject to criticism.  One potential problem was that the curators 
had approval over contractor proposals before they were put up to a 
tokenholder vote.166 This power was put in place primarily as a 
diligence function, because the DAO smart contract could not on its 
own separate genuine “real world” proposals from fake ones, but it 
also allowed for curators to favor companies they preferred.167 
Curators could also affect the result by choosing the order that 
different proposals were put forward to the token holders, favoring 
certain deals by submitting them to tokenholder vote first.168  
The 2016 DAO organizers defended the use of curators, saying 
that they merely served an administrative function.169 They also 
claimed that there was an additional check on the curators’ control 
because the DAO selected curators via vote, adding an element of 
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democracy.170  However, Jentzsch’s white paper itself observed that 
limiting the DAO to one curator would give that individual 
“considerable power.”171   
Notably, the 2016 DAO organizers were relatively sophisticated 
in their governance analysis.  One marker of such sophistication 
was understanding the potential perils posed to the minority. 
Jentzsch formalized protection for the minority investors from what 
he called a “majority robs minority attack” by creating an exit 
mechanism.172  As he points out, once capital is invested, the 
minority becomes vulnerable to majority oppression “by changing 
governance and ownership rules after DAO formation.  For 
example, an attacker with 51% of the tokens, acquired ether during 
the fueling period or created afterwards, could make a proposal to 
send all the funds to themselves.  Since they would hold the majority 
of the tokens, they would always be able to pass their proposals.”173 
Jentzsch proposed a creative mechanism to protect the minority 
from this type of oppression: a split.174  If a tokenholder disagreed 
with a proposal that the majority proposed, or simply wanted to 
withdraw its ether before the proposal was funded, it could propose 
to form a new DAO, termed a “split-DAO” or “child DAO.”175  Any 
tokenholders that voted for the proposal could move their portion of 
the ether to the new DAO with a new proposed curator.176  There 
was no quorum requirement, allowing any single token holder to 
exit the DAO on his or her own.  Split proposals took seven days to 
‘mature’ and get participants in—seven days less than the two week 
minimum proposal period, to ensure that token holders could 
retrieve their funds before a “potentially malicious” proposal was 
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approved.177  Any participants voting “yes” in the split would mean 
that the ether controlled by the splitters would go into the split-
DAO, paying out any accrued “reward” pro-rata to the splitters.178  
C.  THE “HACK” AND HARD FORK 
Ironically, the split-DAO mechanism intended to protect the 
minority carried within it the seeds of the DAO’s undoing.  On June 
12, Slock.it member and Ethereum co-founder, Stephen Taul, 
announced that a “recursive call bug” was found in the DAO’s 
code.179  In essence, the problem was that it allowed a requester of 
tokens to receive tokens in a split DAO without updating the 
requester’s balance before the tokens were sent.180  Because the 
requester’s balance was not updated until the end of the string of 
code, the splitter could repeat the request for additional tokens 
before his or her balance was updated and thus, continue to receive 
tokens.181  It would be as if a bank customer could take out funds 
from an ATM without her checking account updating to reflect the 
withdrawal.  The concerns over this bug proved fatal when, on June 
17, someone took advantage of the recursive bug and siphoned $50 
million of ether into a split-DAO.182 
While most media outlets characterized this attack as a “hack,” 
an open letter purporting to be from the perpetrator of the June 17 
attack, addressed “To the DAO and the Ethereum community,” 
disagreed:  
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I have carefully examined the code of The DAO and 
decided to participate after finding the feature where 
splitting is rewarded with additional ether. I have made 
use of this feature and have rightfully claimed 
3,641,694 ether, and would like to thank the DAO for 
this reward. It is my understanding that the DAO code 
contains this feature to promote decentralization and 
encourage the creation of “child DAOs”. 
 
I am disappointed by those who are characterizing the 
use of this intentional feature as “theft.” I am making 
use of this explicitly coded feature as per the smart 
contract terms and my law firm has advised me that my 
action is fully compliant with United States criminal 
and tort law. For reference please review the terms of 
the DAO.183 
The letter proceeded to quote from the DAO’s terms, which stated:  
The terms of The DAO Creation are set forth in the 
smart contract code existing on the Ethereum 
blockchain at 0xbb9bc244d798123fde783fcc1c72d3bb8 
c189413. Nothing in this explanation of terms or in any 
other document or communication may modify or add 
any additional obligations or guarantees beyond those 
set forth in The DAO’s code. Any and all explanatory 
terms or descriptions are merely offered for educational 
purposes and do not supercede or modify the express 
terms of The DAO’s code set forth on the blockchain; to 
the extent you believe there to be any conflict or 
discrepancy between the descriptions offered here and 
the functionality of The DAO’s code at 
0xbb9bc244d798123fde783fcc1c72d3bb8c189413, The 
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DAO’s code controls and sets forth all terms of The DAO 
Creation.184 
That ominous music is crescendoing now.  The smart contract that 
had created the DAO thus sowed the seeds of its undoing.  The 
founders had no contractual way to address the hack. Neither they, 
nor anyone else, could reverse the transaction and restore the split 
DAO funds to the main DAO account.   
Yet one way out remained.  Because each DAO transaction was 
recorded in the Ethereum blockchain, if enough of the Ethereum 
network agreed to it, the Ethereum team could release a new 
version of the underlying blockchain—essentially altering the 
ledger to reverse all of the DAO exploiter’s transactions. These 
changes to the Ethereum protocol were referred to as the “hard fork” 
solution because the change would split, or fork, the blockchain into 
two separate and incompatible chains: the original blockchain on 
which the split DAO occurred, and the revised chain that would 
erase all of the 2016 DAO transactions.185 This hard fork solution 
restored the money siphoned off, but also undermined the central 
premise and promise of the DAO—that  the underlying code 
constituted the unalterable “law” of the DAO, upon which all 
participants could rely.186  
The 2016 DAO thus presented an existential crisis. Indeed, the 
hard fork proposal created great controversy within the Ethereum 
community, with a fundamental difference of opinion between hard-
fork supporters and blockchain purists.187  Ultimately, the hard fork 
was supported by a super majority (85-89%) of ether holders.188  The 
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Ethereum network erased the blockchain from the point of the token 
diversion forward, wiping out its effects.189 All original 2016 DAO 
investors were refunded, but the hard fork effectively led to the 
dissolution of the 2016 DAO.190  Ethereum Classic exists as a kind 
of alternate reality blockchain version of Ethereum, trading at a 
significant discount but continuing nonetheless.191 
D.  THE DAO’S UNEASY FIT IN EXISTING ORGANIZATION LAW  
What does one make of the 2016 DAO story?  The first challenge 
is to locate the 2016 DAO within range of traditional business 
entities.  Historically, limited liability status has been available 
only by filing an organizational document with a governmental 
agency, and fulfilling appropriate statutory requirements.192  
Governing rules typically require specifying the entity’s organizers, 
its initial capital structure, its registered agent for service of process 
purposes, and the payment of the requisite filing fee.193  
The DAO organizers disclaimed any legal organizational 
structure.194  Yet these disclaimers are to no avail when it comes to 
the application of partnership’s default rules. The 2016 DAO 
participants entered into an association of two or more persons to 
carry on as co-owners a business for profit. Foolish or naïve, they 
tried to disclaim joint and several unlimited liability, but they could 
not. They were at risk for the full total of the firm’s debt, and in 
theory the firm could be liquidated by any one of the tokenholders’ 
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creditors.  Cases are legion about how courts use a functional 
approach to determine whether a partnership was formed.195 
Indeed, the sharing of profits is prima facie evidence of a 
partnership,196 and the 2016 DAO expressly contemplated that 
tokenholders would participate in the profits of the business. 
The 2016 DAO organizers and DAO enthusiasts often slipped 
into corporate terminology when describing the potential of the 
DAO.  They rhapsodized about its ability to do away with the board 
of directors, creating a new level of transparency and direct 
involvement befitting a virtual corporation.197 But because they 
failed to take the requisite statutory steps, they did not create a 
corporation.  The irony was that instead they created that the age-
old business organization, a partnership.198  
And that, with the major exception of the impact of U.S. 
securities law (of which more later) is as far as the 2016 DAO goes 
in terms of organizational law.  Yet that’s not the end of the story.  
While the 2016 DAO failed spectacularly, its existence raises the 
prospect of a radically new phenomenon.  The DAO of the future 
could be an entity that, via a combination of contract and the 
peculiar characteristics of the blockchain, exhibits the features 
formerly only available to corporations: limited liability and asset 
partitioning, including liquidation protection.  
This newfound power is the result the blockchain’s nature as a 
public ledger.  As we have seen, in traditional business associations, 
only the corporate form can reliably separate firm assets from the 
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creditors and partner assets from the creditors of the firm.  The 
partnership form automatically fills in as the default form if the 
parties do not affirmatively organize as a limited liability entity. 
The risk that poses is ultimately the risks that someone not bound 
by intrafirm contracts—a creditor, either of the partnership or the 
individual partners—will make an unanticipated and unavoidable 
claim on assets that the parties desire to shield. 
The transparency of the blockchain, coupled with its 
imperviousness to defaults, creates such a shield.   Blockchain 
participants know exactly what contracts and claims they are 
subject to in a way that their corporeal firm counterparts cannot.  
We return to the various features of corporate law that have, so far, 
been understood to be unique to the corporate form to see how the 
blockchain can approximate them.  
III.  THE PROMISE OF THE BLOCKCHAIN 
With the corporate exceptionalism theories of Part I in mind, we 
can begin to appreciate the potential the DAO offers of upending the 
spectrum of business entities.  Perhaps it would help to start with 
how lawsuits look in the real world. Susan operates a small nail care 
business with Jim, Susan’s Salon. She’s gotten in over her head, and 
the salon owes suppliers more than it can pay. The business folds, 
and it turns out that Susan never filed with the state where she 
operates as a corporation, LLC, or other limited liability entity.  As 
a result, Susan is personally liable for the debts of the business 
creditors.199 They take her to court, prove that she is liable, and 
obtain a judgment against her. She is forced to sell her house and 
car to pay the judgment.  
Now let’s suppose Susan instead set up a different business on 
the blockchain, Susan’s Blockchain Storage (SBS), that will create 
a decentralized marketplace for storing files, using the blockchain 
to encrypt them.200  Any business faces two types of potential 
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creditors, voluntary and involuntary (that is, tort) creditors.201  As 
to the former, the code of the blockchain would have to specify the 
terms and conditions of loans in order for an obligation to arise.  
The 2016 DAO had no creditors. Although its coders described it 
in terms of a corporation, it was more of a virtual venture capital 
fund—it had no operating costs, and thus no need of creditors.  But 
future DAOs could offer a security interest to creditors that could 
be baked directly into the smart contract.  One could imagine a 
creditor lending to a future DAO, on the condition of a smart 
contract that provides the terms for repayment with interest.  The 
DAO could in the initial code—or after, presumably, with a 
subsequent vote—create debt versions of tokens that automatically 
entitle creditors to assets under certain circumstances: including 
before a split, before a liquidation, or upon certain dates or under 
certain conditions, as when token activity reaches a specified level.  
The attraction from the creditors’ perspective is considerable. 
Monitoring a borrower’s activities constitutes a major transaction 
cost of any loan arrangement (for this reason, banks and other 
lenders protect themselves with covenants, inspection rights, and 
other mechanisms to ensure that the creditor can be assured of 
repayment).202  But monitoring would be far less costly if the 
creditor could code enforcement mechanisms directly into the 
contract.  On the blockchain, creditors would have to do very little 
in monitoring asset levels and prior claims, because the contract 
encoded in the DAO would protect their interest.  In this sense, 
creditors could lend money without the risk of opportunism, and the 
high cost of monitoring, as long as the code itself established, for 
example, trigger points for return of principal.  For example, the 
code could specify that if the DAO’s assets dip below a certain 
amount, the debt is automatically called and the loan repaid.  
Interest rates could reset automatically, and creditors could waive 
protective covenants by means of voting on the blockchain. 
A key point is this: in order to mimic their real-world 
counterparts in obtaining a right to individual tokenholders’ 
personal assets—a right that is automatically theirs in traditional 
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partnerships203—creditors would have to establish that right within 
the blockchain code.  Otherwise, although DAO creditors would 
have the theoretical right to reach those personal assets, in practice 
the blockchain would not permit them to do so.  On the other hand, 
tort creditors are involuntary creditors who cannot anticipate being 
the victims of a particular tortfeasor.204  These creditors would have 
no ability to contract for recourse to tokenholder, and the default 
code would, as with voluntary creditors, not permit access to 
individual accounts.  A DAO creditor would have to reduce a claim 
to judgment, track down individual tokenholders, and convince 
judges to enforce a claim.      
In summary, say a loan of one of the creditors of SBS, our 
hypothetical business, is not repaid because of a fault in the code.  
The creditor convinces a New York court that it has jurisdiction.  It 
obtains a judgment against SBS for $100,000.  It cannot enforce a 
judgment against SBS unless the blockchain has a way to recognize 
valid court orders and effectuate them.  In other words, it would 
need a legal intervention point coded into the blockchain that 
recognized the legitimacy of the judgment, and provided a means to 
effectuate it. What of SBS’s tokenholders?  What of the unlimited 
joint and several personal liability that makes real-world 
partnership such a dangerous form?  The answer to that question, 
and the potential for a legal intervention point in the intersection 
between the blockchain and the tokenholder’s corporeal-world 
identity, takes us that central corporate feature, limited liability. 
A.  LIMITED LIABILITY  
SBS’s creditor would need to identify the true identity of Susan, 
or at least one of SBS’s tokenholders in order to get at that 
tokenholder’s personal assets.  Then the creditor would have to 
prove that the tokenholder in question held the tokens at the time 
of the default.  In a sense, the blockchain makes this proof easy by 
laying bare the history of all of SBS’s transactions.  Even with this 
proof, however, SBS’s creditor faces two obstacles to satisfying a 
judgment: the code will almost certainly not automatically provide 
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access to tokenholder accounts. And the pseudonymous nature of 
the blockchain creates a practical obstacle to pursuing individual 
tokenholders’ real-world assets.   
First, while in theory one could imagine tokenholders agreeing 
to some level of individual recourse (for example, that the DAO 
creditor could reach into a tokenholder’s personal wallet for up to 50 
ether), in practice it is hard to imagine a tokenholder affirmatively 
opting into the partnership’s default of unlimited liability by 
permitting a DAO creditor unlimited access to a personal wallet.  
Yet that’s exactly what would have to occur in order to mirror real-
world unlimited liability. An entity-level escrow account would be 
the more natural mechanism for providing such protection.  More 
likely would be for the DAOs of the future to encode protections 
contractually limiting DAO creditors to claims upon the DAO and 
the DAO alone—thus contracting for limited liability, again in the 
absence of the corporate code.   
Second, the law presupposes that the partnership’s creditors will 
be able to ascertain the partners’ identities, and then pursue them 
to satisfy the firm’s debts.  While a partnership creditor in the real 
world can expect headaches and holdups in identifying the 
appropriate jurisdiction, reducing a claim to judgment and then 
locating and attaching partner assets,205 at least the creditor knows 
what defendants to go after.   
The virtual world of the blockchain is a different story.  
Ethereum and other DTLs are not anonymous, but, rather, pseudo-
anonymous, or pseudonymous:206 the blockchain preserves all 
transactions in the network, allowing anyone to inspect and analyze 
them.207 All transactions linked to a particular address are visible 
on the blockchain, which is public and transparent.208 However, it 
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is not possible to link a particular wallet address to the real-world 
identity of a person/company without additional information.209 
Security experts described this as “pseudonymous privacy,” 
comparing it to “writing books under a nom de plume.”210  An 
anonymous author can produce dozens of books under a pseudonym.  
J.K. Rowling penned the Cuckoo’s Calling under the nom de plume 
Robert Galbraith—just as Stephen King wrote under the name 
Richard Bachman.211  In each case, the pseudonym cloaked the 
author’s true identity effectively for a time.  But once the 
pseudonym was linked to its real-life counterpart, the author’s 
entire pseudonymic writing history became compromised. 
Similarly, as soon as individuals’ personal details are linked to their 
bitcoin (to use the most widespread cryptocurrency) address, their 
entire transaction history—including any available assets—are laid 
bare as well.212 
As former federal prosecutor Jason Weinstein explains:  
A user’s bitcoin address is just an account number that 
stays with the user; if you can connect that address to a 
particular user, you can identify and trace all of the 
transactions in which that individual has participated 
using that address. Indeed, if the individual uses an 
exchange or wallet service as the “on ramp” to the 
blockchain, then the bitcoin address is essentially about 
as anonymous as a bank account number, because the 
exchange or wallet service will maintain records linking 
the address to a particular identity, much like a bank 
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maintains records establishing the owner of each bank 
account.213 
Note that the pseudonymity of cryptocurrency does not perfectly 
protect against identification.  There are three main ways in which 
to de-anonymize bitcoin users (and the same principles apply to 
Ethereum):214 
1) Because bitcoin is a peer-to-peer network 
(vulnerable to hackers), if hackers can connect to 
the bitcoin network using several nodes or 
computers, there is a high chance that they can 
extract enough information to decipher where 
transactions originated.215 
2) Bitcoin addresses can be linked to real identities if 
these real identities are used in combination with 
the bitcoin addresses in some way. This includes 
addresses used to deposit or withdraw money to or 
from a (regulated) exchange or wallet service, 
publicly exposed donation addresses, or addresses 
simply used to send bitcoin to someone (including 
the online store) when using a real identity.  
Cryptocurrency exchanges are subject to know-
your-customer and anti-money laundering rules, so 
individuals making use of these exchanges—as will 
most unsophisticated users—can be relatively 
easily identified by law enforcement.216 
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3) Perhaps most importantly, all transactions over 
the bitcoin network are completely transparent and 
traceable by anyone. It is typically this complete 
transparency that allows multiple bitcoin addresses 
to be clustered together, and be tied to the same 
user. Therefore, if just one of these clustered 
addresses is linked to a real-world identity through 
one or several of the other de-anonymizing 
methods, all clustered addresses can be revealed.217 
Nevertheless, as one commentator has observed, sophisticated 
users who are willing to go to “extraordinary lengths” can find ways 
to acquire and use bitcoin anonymously.  Even so, “the open nature 
of the transaction ledger and other unknowns leave open the 
possibility that identities and activities once considered perfectly 
secure may be revealed at some point down the road.”218 
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In conclusion, DAO tokenholders enjoy two main bulwarks 
against personal liability for firm liabilities. First, the blockchain 
itself can limit contract creditors to the assets of the firm.  Though 
this is a smart contract, presumably a court would recognize its 
validity in the real world, since the creditor has affirmatively agreed 
not to have recourse to individual tokenholders assets. Second, for 
tort creditors219 or non-tort without contractual protections in place, 
pseudonymity provides a weaker shield against firm liabilities. A 
creditor faced with the prospect of finding the right jurisdiction, 
reducing a claim to judgment, and then identifying and tracking 
down tokenholders may well conclude the effort is not worth her 
time.   
B.  ASSET PARTITIONING VIA CONTRACT ALONE 
Remember, the reverse of limited liability is entity shielding.220  
Here the concern is the threat that the debts of the partners pose to 
the entity itself. Say Susan owns tokens of a DAO.  Further say that 
her creditors are able to reduce their claims against her to 
judgment.  Susan, like presumably most debtors, would likely try 
not to disclose that she had a blockchain asset.   Her creditors or the 
bankruptcy court would first have to know of the existence of her 
wallet, with the tokens, ether, or bitcoins contained therein.  But 
what if creditors determine that she owns DAO tokens?  They could 
go to court (presuming they can find a court with jurisdiction) to 
require her to divulge her key.  They would have to prove their claim 
on any tokens or assets in the wallet—presumably they could do so 
with ease.  Then they could force her to transfer any tokens in the 
wallet.  But they could not use those tokens to force liquidation of 
the actual business—or, following the more modern rule, a buyout 
of whatever the tokens are worth.  
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This inability stems from the fact that the blockchain is a 
decentralized and distributed technology.  There is no one person 
that controls the code.  Even if a court rendered judgment in favor 
of a particular creditor, if the code did not permit a liquidation, then 
any attempt by a creditor or a coder in the creditor’s employ to 
update the blockchain to liquidate the entity would be rejected by 
the consensus of miners.  Such a change would therefore not become 
part of the distributed ledger.  Thus, even after finding a court with 
jurisdiction, attempts to enforce a judgment against an organization 
would founder if that organization’s basic code does not recognize 
such a judgment.  
Again, the lack of a legal intervention point protects against the 
traditional partnership vulnerability to partner creditors.  Thus, 
while the DAO in theory may be a partnership, that most vulnerable 
of business forms, legal recourse in practice will prove well-nigh 
impossible. 
To summarize, the DAO is legally a partnership, so that personal 
creditors could in theory liquidate it.  But the tokens do not give her 
that power.  Hansmann, Kraakman, and Squire assert that only 
organizational law can perform the entity shielding function of 
providing protection from the creditors of individual investors, but 
in the virtual world contract can play the role.221  Because the smart 
contract does not permit liquidation, effectively it provides entity 
shielding.   
More broadly than mere entity shielding, the blockchain provides 
a radical form of asset partitioning.  Because of the ability to code 
smart contracts directly into the blockchain, assets can be reliably 
apportioned to specific uses without the need for a separate entity 
structure, obviating the need for a separate organization Triantis 
identifies. Similarly, addressing Blair’s concern about capital lock-
in, a DAO’s blockchain could provide that no single tokenholder 
could liquidate the blockchain.  Indeed, as a practical matter, it 
would be difficult, if not impossible, to enforce any theoretical 
liquidation right if it is not already encoded in the block chain. 
This point is worth restating.  In theory, the tokenholders’ 
creditors would have the right to liquidate the DAO. But in practice, 
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the DAO would have to code that right in to provide a legal 
intervention point on which the penalty default rules of partnership 
a place to take effect. The law gives creditors that power in the real 
world. But it cannot in the DAO.  
IV.  LEGAL INTERVENTION POINTS 
So far, I have treated the blockchain as being unto itself, a nexus 
of contracts made flesh. The first section of this part will continue 
in that vein. But the idea of a fully autonomous business 
organization untethered to the corporeal world is, and may always 
be, largely fanciful. In the second section, however, the lens will 
widen to explore the question of legal intervention points for 
blockchain entities not organized wholly on the blockchain.  Here 
the law can and will intervene. 
A.  THE PURE BLOCKCHAIN BUSINESS ORGANIZATION  
Can business entities exist on the blockchain alone?  If so, then 
no legal intervention point will exist unless explicitly coded.  Section 
1 argues that such entities can in fact exist, and Section 2 sketches 
out some possible governance models for such organizations.  
1.  The Possibility of a Purely Blockchain Entity.  The easiest way 
for blockchain entities to evade the reach of the law would be to 
organize entirely on the blockchain, without the organizers 
identifying themselves in any way as associated with the blockchain 
entity.  The idea of strangers organizing via pseudonyms and trying 
to coordinate a governance structure is not as unthinkable as one 
might suppose.  The true identity of bitcoin’s designer or designers 
is unknown—“Satoshi Nakamoto” is the pseudonym he, she, or they 
used.222  Bitcoin was born out a distrust for authority and driven by 
a desire for governance by community consensus rather than 
central authority.223  Nakamoto seems not to have been a promoter 
looking to make a quick buck, but rather an idealist looking to break 
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governments’ monopoly on currency by offering an alternative to 
fiat currency.224  Bitcoin suggests that it might be possible, even 
likely, given the open source ethos of the blockchain, for a business 
organization to exist that encoded real governance into its code, 
enabling pseudonymous participants to engage in real decision-
making for the firm without identifiable organizers claiming credit 
for doing so.  
One white paper describes a DAO as “a self-organizing entity” 
that “better resembles an organism rather than an organization.”225  
In fact, a fully autonomous, self-reproducing DAO now exists: the 
Plantoid, “a robot or synthetic organism designed to look, act and 
grow like a plant.”226  As Carla Reyes describes it: 
If an onlooker passing by the Plantoid sufficiently 
appreciates the Plantoid's artistic qualities, the 
onlooker may send a donation to the Plantoid through 
the decentralized virtual currency called bitcoin. The 
onlooker sends the bitcoin directly to a wallet owned by 
the Plantoid itself. As an expression of gratitude for the 
funds transfer, the Plantoid performs a dance for the 
onlooker. Once the Plantoid raises sufficient funds, the 
Plantoid advertises for, selects, and commissions an 
artist to create a new Plantoid.227 
If the DAO is an organism, creating its own nexus of contracts as it 
goes, there may be little room in its operation for formal law at all.  
It can make its own rules (as we will see, quite sophisticated rules), 
and even replicate, all autonomously, without an identifiable 
individual doing the organizing.  And without an individual on the 
scene, there is no actor for the law to latch onto.  The code really is 
the law—the only law.  There is no legal intervention point on which 
the law can work. 
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To be clear, this point is not a normative one.  I am not a cyber-
separatist, arguing that regulation should not apply to the 
blockchain.228  I am merely pointing out that, for the first time as a 
practical matter, the possibility exists of a type of business 
organization that can exist apart from the defaults of contract law.  
It may be that this possibility will remain an obscure footnote in the 
history of the blockchain, and that examples such as the Plantoid or 
bitcoin are aberrations.  It may be that people who create entities 
generally do so to make a profit, and ultimately cannot do so solely 
on the blockchain.  If international regulation makes it impossible 
to exchange bitcoin for fiat currency, and the bitcoin economy 
remains as limited as it is now, even Satoshi Nakamoto (or the 
Satoshi Nakamotos of the future) may not see much profit in pure 
blockchain entities.  The intersection between blockchain and the 
corporeal world will then provide a legal intervention point, as Part 
IV will describe.   
For now, it remains to be seen whether pure blockchain entities 
are viable.  Accept for the moment that such entities will exist in 
the future.  Any discussion of the purely blockchain entity must deal 
with the problem the 2016 DAO posed—the problem that represents 
the flipside of the freedom from default rules that the 2016 DAO 
cast in stark relief.  As Easterbrook and Fischel have observed, even 
when parties think they have planned for every eventuality, “they 
are apt to miss something” because “[a]ll sorts of complexities will 
arise later.”229  The central argument of The Economic Structure of 
Corporate Law230 is that corporate law supplies majoritarian 
default rules that fill the gaps of parties’ necessarily incomplete 
contracts.  Yet, as we have seen, when gaps arise in the blockchain’s 
smart contracts, there are no legal intervention points upon which 
the law can work.  The blockchain needs intervention points in order 
to fill the gaps in incomplete contracts.  Said differently, blockchain 
entities have a governance problem. 
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2.  The Problem of Blockchain Governance.  The failure of the 
2016 DAO made clear the problem of governance on the blockchain.  
There is no code that could anticipate all problems that will arise. 
The problem with the 2016 DAO was that it didn’t provide a 
mechanism for the tokenholders to vote to change the code to 
address the flaw once it arose. This section will describe three 
different governance models that emerged in the post-2016-DAO 
era to address the governance failures of the DAO. Notably, each of 
these mechanisms creates an intervention point—a place in the 
code where participants can supply terms to the incomplete contract 
in light of events following the initial launch of the code-contract.  
None of them supply a legal intervention point—that is, a point 
where a legal authority can assert jurisdiction.  But they do supply 
intervention points, nonetheless. 
First, DAOStack illustrates a dizzying array of governance 
options unimaginable in a traditional corporation.  For example, 
imagine a corporation that weighs some shares more than others 
using a reputation system, rather than operating on a vote-per-
share basis.  DAOStack enables a DAO to institute such a system, 
whereby tokenholders can earn reputation—for example, for past 
contributions or successful proposals to the DAO.231  Reputation, 
unlike tokens, is not transferrable, but instead awarded to or earned 
by “specific members, according to their merits and contributions 
made to the organizations.”232  To guard against locking up decision-
making power with a group that could become less engaged down 
the road, an organization can provide that reputation will dissipate 
over time.233   
A common concern in public corporations is voter apathy, and the 
corporation generally offers the blunt tool of quorum to ensure that 
low voter turnout does not allow a minority preference to govern.234  
With DAOStack, voting schemes can be weighted by reputation.235  
                                                                                                                   
 231 DAO Stack, White Paper V1.0, 2 (Oct. 29, 2017), https://drive.google.com/file/d/1CqNhy-
P1IaZMWkPUf61HYZ5zo1FnDYAp/view. 
 232 Id. at 6.  
 233 Id. at 15. 
 234 Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 129, 175 
n.17 (2009). 
 235 DAO Stack, White Paper V1.0, 21 (Oct. 29, 2017), https://drive.google.com/file/d/1CqN 
hy-P1IaZMWkPUf61HYZ5zo1FnDYAp/view. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3127782 
2018] LAW AND THE BLOCKCHAIN  51 
 
There can be a finite number of proposals open to vote at any one 
time—with all other proposals in a queue.236  Tokenholders need not 
rely on an individual or individuals to serve as gatekeepers or 
agenda-setters.237  If there is a queue, a tokenholder can “boost” a 
proposal by putting tokens at stake that will be returned if the 
proposal is successful.238     
Moreover, just as bitcoin has issuance limits, the DAOStack 
organization can build in certain constraints.  Examples offered 
include a cap of the total number of tokens that can be issued, a rate 
of token inflation, a limit on the use of funds, a maximum amount 
of reputation that can be issued in a given time period, and more.239  
For lawyers, these strictures might seem akin to charter-based 
limits on the authorized number of shares.  As a practical, matter, 
however, they provide protection against future dilution even more 
robust than those found in the corporeal corporation: they are self-
enforcing structural constraints. Finally, DAOStack provides what 
the 2016 DAO failed to offer: a mechanism for amending its 
governance structure.  Called “governance upgrades,” these allow 
the organization to specify the mechanism for changing their 
governance models.240 As the DAOStack white paper remarks, “the 
spectrum of possibility [a] scheme’s design [allows] is nearly 
endless.”241 
Another blockchain operator, Aragon offers would-be 
entrepreneurs the ability to organize on the blockchain, issue 
tokens, and raise funds.242 But Aragon goes further in creating 
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private law on the blockchain.  As the whitepaper observes, “The 
traditional solutions to [opportunistic behavior] are government-
powered jurisdictions. Since Aragon organizations are location and 
government-agnostic—they are meant to be run on the Ethereum 
network—we came out with a better solution.”243 The Aragon 
Network provides “basic constitution and governance methods.”244  
Within the Network, organizations can create new laws specific to 
their organization.245   
Aragon also provides an “unbiased arbitration system…for cases 
where conflict is not explicitly resolved in the smart contract 
code.”246  The nuances are beyond the scope of this Article, but some 
details make clear the level of thought behind the effort.  
Arbitration requires an applicant posting a bond of tokens, or 
putting a freeze on an organization’s contracts if the applicant has 
an ownership interest in the organization.247  A panel of judges 
render a verdict via a “two-step reveal” to prevent collusion on the 
part of the judges.248  They must reveal their verdict in order to 
learn their fellow panelists’ decision.  If the applicant is successful, 
her bond is returned; if unsuccessful, the judges keep it.  If 
applicants are dissatisfied, they can appeal (or “request an 
upgrade,” in Aragon parlance) by posting a “significantly larger” 
bond and having all of the available judges participate.249 All judges 
who “voted the incorrect answer are extremely penalized.”250  
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Finally, a supreme court is composed of the top nine judges, as 
measured by which judges have sided with the majority the most in 
the past.251   
It has not likely been lost on the reader that each of these 
examples is, in one manner or another, recreating governance 
mechanisms familiar in the corporeal world—even to the extent of 
Aragon mimicking the number of the justices on the U.S. Supreme 
Court.   
Tezos stands as a cautionary tale regarding blockchain 
governance. Hard on the heels of the 2016 DAO’s hard fork, the first 
problem Tezos aimed to solve was the “hard fork” problem, or the 
inability for Bitcoin to dynamically innovate due to coordination 
issues.252 A Tezos tokenholder could propose an alteration to the 
community of token holders.253 If a quorum was reached, and a 
majority voted for the proposal, the alteration would be 
implemented to the blockchain.254 This structure provided a fluid 
system of governance over time and was intended to eliminate the 
need for a 2016-DAO-style hard fork.255  Tezos’s ICO in July of 2017 
garnered $232 million in bitcoin and Ether, which rose to be worth 
almost $1 billion at the end of the year as the cryptocurrency it 
raised increased in value.256 Ironically, however, Tezos’ ICO has 
been mired in a governance dispute amongst its founders and is on 
indefinite hold.257 
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Voltaire once declared that “If god did not exist, it would be 
necessary to invent him.”258  In similar fashion, it may well be that, 
if business associations law does not exist on the blockchain, the 
blockchain will have to create it.    DAOs, like all organizations and 
all organisms, require some kind of governance mechanism when 
inevitable gaps arise in the incomplete contract of the firm.  As the 
emergence of Aragon illustrates, newfangled organizations have an 
appetite to address these governance issues.  They seem willing to 
borrow from traditional models, but also ready to adapt them to the 
challenges of the pseudonymous world of the blockchain.  This 
Section has provided examples of the many governance options 
available on the blockchain.   While many of these options will be 
obsolete by the time this Article goes to print, the larger point will 
not: the DAO opens up a dizzying array of governance possibilities 
as long as intervention points exist in the code, where governance 
can be exercised.  As long as these organizations exist solely on the 
blockchain, their interaction with traditional business law—as well 
as securities law and other forms of state regulation—could be 
minimal. 
The contours of governance on the blockchain—and the extent to 
which jurisdictions will recognize it, or even have the chance to 
recognize it—remain open questions.  Another open question is how 
securities law, and other law, will interact with the blockchain.  
Most entities organized on the blockchain thus far have had 
identifiable human organizers who remain susceptible to the reach 
of laws, even if the blockchain itself resists it.  This is a key point: 
as long as there are identifiable organizers in the corporeal world—
as long as an entity does not exist solely on the blockchain—they 
will provide a legal intervention point.  The next Section begins with 
U.S. securities law, as it is the law that has been the most 
influential in shaping the contours of ICOs.  But the two key 
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questions are broader ones: Where are the legal intervention points 
in the blockchain? And how should the law work upon them? 
B.  CORPOREAL ENTITIES WITH ASSOCIATED BLOCKCHAIN 
ORGANIZATIONS 
So far most ICOs and DAOs have not organized purely on the 
blockchain.  Instead they have opted for some identifiable group of 
promoters.  This move puts them squarely subject to regulation by 
governing authorities.  The ways in which the U.S. and other 
jurisdictions will regulate the blockchain are still open questions.  
Coin exchanges, for example, are subject to anti-money laundering 
and Know Your Customer regulations.259  South Korea recently put 
in place measures to curb cryptocurrency speculation by requiring 
trading only through real-name bank accounts linked to 
cryptocurrency exchanges.260   
Staying within the scope of business associations law, once the 
identity of a blockchain owner is known, a court could establish 
jurisdiction over the blockchain business association as a 
partnership by establishing personal jurisdiction over the known 
individual.  Personal jurisdiction over a single partner is enough to 
establish personal jurisdiction over the partnership and, in some 
jurisdictions, over the remaining partners.261  Any enforcement 
against the blockchain entity would suffer from the handicaps 
discussed in Part III.B.  A judgment calling for dissolution of a DAO 
would have no effect upon code unless the code permits it.  But a 
court could enforce a judgment against any individual partners 
whose identities are known, either because they were chief 
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organizers or because the true identity behind their pseudonym has 
been discovered. 
The reach of U.S. securities law to these groups provides a 
slightly more developed case study of how regulation might impact 
blockchain entities—and, indeed, how it is shaping the evolution of 
those entities.  Essentially, the question is one of how much power 
tokenholders have, and what rights and responsibilities should flow 
from that power.  Both questions are very much open, as we will see.  
As we will also see, the nature of the solution to the governance 
problem has direct repercussions for securities law. 
On July 25, 2017, the SEC released a “Report of Investigation” 
(SEC Report) deeming 2016 DAO tokens to be securities—meaning 
that their issuance was illegal because the 2016 DAO did not 
register an initial public offering with the SEC or qualify for an 
exemption from registration.262  While the SEC did not pursue an 
enforcement action against the 2016 DAO organizers, the SEC 
Report did have a profound effect on subsequent initial coin 
offerings, which now seek to evade the reach of U.S. securities 
laws.263    
The SEC’s conclusion that the 2016 DAO tokens were securities 
is not surprising giving the breadth of the definition of one type of 
security, the investment contract.264  The Howey test for what 
constitutes an investment contract is an investment of money in “a 
common enterprise” where profits are expected to be derived “solely 
from the efforts of others.”265  A key focus of the SEC Report was the 
fact that the DAO’s profits were to be derived from the efforts of 
others, namely the DAO’s founders and its curators.266  In 
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particular, the SEC cited the fact that Slock.it created the DAO 
website, published a White Paper describing the DAO, and created, 
maintained, and “closely monitored” online fora about the DAO.267  
They held themselves out as experts on Ethereum, and told 
investors that they had selected curators “based on their expertise 
and credentials.”268  Slock.it also informed investors that it would 
make the first proposal to the DAO.  In short, “[t]hrough their 
conduct and marketing materials, Slock.it and its co-founders led 
investors to believe that they could be relied on to provide the 
significant managerial efforts required to make The DAO a 
success.”269 
The SEC emphasized in particular how dependent tokenholders 
were on the efforts of Slock.it and its co-founders.  “At the time of 
the offering, The DAO’s protocols had already been pre-determined 
by Slock.it and its co-founders, including the control that could be 
exercised by the Curators.”270       
This characterization of the 2016 DAO tokens as securities 
remains in dispute, however.  Randolph Robinson takes issue with 
the SEC’s Report, challenging the claim that the 2016 DAO was a 
“common enterprise” under the Howey test.271 Most intriguingly, he 
argues that commonality requires “investors’ dependence on the 
promoter’s expertise.”272  But he argues, once the 2016 DAO’s code 
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was launched, Slock.it, the 2016 DAO promoter, exercised no 
expertise—indeed, it retained no control whatsoever over the 
management of the DAO at all: 
Unlike in a traditional enterprise where the promoter 
or management enjoys special decision making 
privileges or the ability to control entity assets, here, as 
the promoter, Slock.it was just one of many token 
holders, holding the same rights as any other token 
holder in the DAO enterprise. Neither Slock.it nor any 
other individual or entity could take any action to spend 
DAO resources, incur obligations, or take any other 
action independent of a vote of DAO Token holders.273   
Robinson argues that because, after launch, all decisions were made 
collectively by all token holders, there was no collective reliance on 
the DAO promoters’ expertise.274  Similarly, Rohr and Wright argue 
that “[b]ecause each token holder was entitled to participate in each 
funding decision, it is at least arguable that token holders 
participated sufficiently in the profit-making activities of the 
enterprise” for them not to qualify as securities under Howey.275  
This feature means that DAO investors did not have an expectation 
of profits solely from the efforts of others.  Robinson also takes issue 
with the SEC’s characterization of the Curators’ power, arguing 
that it was much less significant than the SEC portrayed.276   
Hearkening back to the various governance possibilities Part VI 
described, we begin to see how complicated, important, and 
unsettled the question of intervention on the blockchain is.  Even if 
the 2016 DAO tokens were securities, if a future DAO tokenholder 
earns reputation and uses that to weigh her votes heavily, at what 
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point is she no longer dependent “solely on the efforts of others” for 
her profits?   
The SEC Report could be describing common critiques of whether 
the shareholder vote provides an effective constraint on a public 
corporation’s managers when it observed:  
the voting rights afforded DAO Token holders did not 
provide them with meaningful control over the 
enterprise, because (1) DAO Token holders’ ability to 
vote for contracts was a largely perfunctory one; and (2) 
DAO Token holders were widely dispersed and limited 
in their ability to communicate with one another.277   
The SEC Report emphasizes the passive, public-company-
shareholder-like role that the tokenholders played.278  But the 
blockchain vote, as we have seen, need not be largely perfunctory, 
and DAOs of the future could make voting far from “perfunctory” 
by, for example, creating reputation-weighted voting in the manner 
of DAOStack.  The blockchain could counteract wide dispersion of 
holdings by coding limits on the number of tokens and could and 
augment tokenholders’ ability to communicate with one another.  
Thus far, ICOs have not followed this robust governance path—
nor have they used anonymity or pseudonymity to evade regulation.  
Currently most ICOs are launched by an organization or group of 
developers.279  Some are traditional business entities or non-profits.  
Others, like the 2016 DAO, are not formally organized at all.280  
They have taken various paths with regard to securities laws.  Some 
have openly flouted the SEC—and the SEC has taken an 
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increasingly active role in actions against them.281  Others have 
tried to evade the reach of U.S. securities laws in three ways. 
First, some ICOs have tried to bar would-be investors from the 
United States from participating, in the hopes that they will qualify 
as foreign offerings under Regulation S.282  In particular, many 
recent ICOs have been launched by nonprofits organized in 
Switzerland to evade the reach of U.S. securities law and the law of 
other jurisdictions.283  Second, promoters have directed offerings not 
to the general public, but instead only to accredited investors, the 
wealthy individuals who qualify to invest in private securities.284  
The SAFT (Simple Agreement for Future Tokens) suggests one way 
to avoid liability under the securities laws is to offer 
investment exclusively to accredited investors, who are more 
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states.”); see also Eugene Kim, Cryptocurrency investors worry about a bubble as Jamie Foxx 
and other celebrities jump on board, CNBC (Sept. 19, 2017), 
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sophisticated and better prepared to accept the risk.285 In other 
words, the SAFT promoters acknowledge that SAFTs are 
investment contracts subject to the 1933 Act, but argue that they 
qualify for exemption from registration because they are offered 
only to accredited investors.286  SAFT investors fund developers who 
“develop a genuinely functional network, with genuinely functional 
utility tokens, and then deliver those tokens to the investors.  The 
investors may then resell the tokens to the public, presumably for a 
profit, and so may the developers.”287  The tokens themselves are 
merely “consumptive products,”288 leading to the third manner of 
evading the reach of U.S. securities law.   
Finally, there has been an effort to develop public token offerings 
would not be securities offerings under the Howey test. These token 
offerings are “utility tokens” or “app coins,” that is, tokens to be used 
for consumptive purposes, and whose primary purpose is not to be 
held for future profit.289  Utility tokens are more like a right to buy 
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a future product or service than a right to participate in the profits 
of a future enterprise.  Rohr and Wright contrast these tokens with 
what they term investment tokens, which “bestow express economic 
rights on their holders.”290  Nevertheless, many of these utility 
token offerings have had a speculative component—either because 
investors are betting that their use rights will go up in value, or 
because they do not understand that they are not receiving an 
equity interest in the offering.   
The SEC is closely monitoring these developments and has 
expressed skepticism about the proliferation of ICOs.  Jay Clayton, 
Chairman of the SEC, stated in December of 2017: “Merely calling 
a token a ‘utility’ token or structuring it to provide some utility does 
not prevent the token from being a security.”291  Clayton further 
noted that offerings that “emphasize the potential for profits based 
on the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others” are “the 
hallmarks of securities under U.S. law.”292  
One neat solution to the securities problem ICOs confront 
involves not trying to evade the Howey test by not offering an 
ownership interest; instead, it involves embracing the need for 
governance and gap-filling by creating intervention points for 
tokenholders to fill.  Once set in motion, a smart contract continues 
to operate autonomously—no single individual can stop it once it 
has begun running.  Thus, if the contract codes for meaningful 
governance amongst DAO tokenholders, then the ownership 
interest would not generate profits “solely through efforts of others.”  
Instead, it would look more like a true partnership interest.  This 
solution has the benefit of neatly tying two threads this Article has 
explored: it not only solves the Howey securities problem, but also 
reintroduces a place for gap-filling in what will inevitably an 
incomplete contract for firm organization at the outset of an 
undertaking.  The result would be that the DAO will function more 
like the partnership it technically is under the law.  
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The point of this Article, however, is not to suggest a solution to 
the Howey problem current ICOs confront.  Instead, its argument is 
simply that the blockchain reshuffles the relationship between the 
law and private ordering.  For better and for worse, the blockchain 
does not provide parties with the intervention points corporeal firms 
naturally supply.  That lack of intervention point is both a bug and 
a feature.   Incomplete contracting teaches that intervention points 
are necessary.   The DAOs of the future, if they exist, will be able to 
configure governance rules in ways previously unimaginable.  But 
legal intervention points remain wherever blockchain organizers 
and their identifiable organizers meet. 
V.  CONCLUSION  
This Article makes no claims that the blockchain is an 
unregulable space.  The history of Internet regulation has taught us 
that borders, governments, and authority will inexorably extend 
wherever legal intervention points exist.293  Instead, its focus has 
been on the world of private ordering and the usual relationship 
between contracting parties and private law that arises on the 
blockchain.  If parties generally “bargain in the shadow of the 
law,”294 so too have they traditionally contracted in the shadow of 
default rules.  Not on the blockchain. 
The nexus of smart contracts of the blockchain represents a 
fundamental challenge to business association law and contracts 
law more generally.  Traditionally, the law must and does provide 
its own governing rules all the time.  One such rule, for example, 
establishes fiduciary duties.  Agency law, the most fundamental 
building block of business association law, provides for a fiduciary 
duty owed by agent to principal, whether or not their agreement 
makes mention of it.295  Business associations law fills gaps. 
There are no similar background rules in the DAO.  The DAO 
explicitly codes the contract law to which it is subject, and default 
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rules have no legal intervention point in which to take effect.  Put 
differently, there is no room in the DAO for a court to determine 
whether fiduciary duties are owed or what business form an entity 
takes.  There is no room for courts to effectuate these kinds of 
judgments.  Absent explicit coding, there is no room for the default 
function of contract law. 
Moreover, prior business association law offered a type of penalty 
default: entrepreneurs filed with the state to obtain specific entity 
status, or were swept into the default business form, the 
partnership.296  The attraction of the corporate form was that it 
provided a reliable way to erect barriers between creditors and 
assets in a way that contract alone could not.  Without the shield of 
the corporate entity, unsuspected claims from creditors outside the 
firm threatened.  Because of the public nature of the blockchain’s 
ledger, however, each of the firm’s contracting parties can see the 
full extent of the firm’s obligations and, by contract alone, protect 
against them.  A partner in a traditional partnership might fear 
that   the partnership was taking on too many obligations, and that 
her assets might be on the hook.  A tokenholder need not fear such 
claims unless the code affirmatively gave creditors access to her 
assets—at least, until her pseudonym was discovered.  Conversely, 
and perhaps more importantly, firm creditors and tokenholders 
alike could trust that a DAO cannot be liquidated by a tokenholder 
or a tokenholder’s creditors—simply because the code does not 
provide such power.  
But the danger of incomplete contracting remains.  Blockchain 
business organizations cannot evolve to the point that they no 
longer need contract law—or, more precisely, that they no longer 
need the gap-filling that contract law traditionally provides.  The 
2016 DAO’s story, although in one sense the height of innovation, 
also revealed its fatal flaw.  The nexus of contracts literature views 
the law—including, but not limited to business organization law—
as a gap filler.297  The 2016 DAO, like the Titanic’s claim to be the 
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unsinkable ship, failed in the hubris of the idea that its coders could 
lay down rules at inception and then have a business organization 
run on autopilot.   
This Article has used the law of business associations as a lens 
through which to view the relationship of law to the blockchain, but 
its lessons extend beyond the reach of organizational law.   The 
blockchain offers the heady promise of self-enforcing contracts, 
making it possible to transact with strangers is a “trustless” 
environment.  Yet with this promise comes a concomitant need to 
reexamine just what role law plays in the relationship between 
contracting parties—and how that role changes when the 
customary intervention points no longer exist.  The story of 
securities law’s shaping of ICOs to offer utility tokens reminds that 
legal intervention points remain, not in the blockchain itself, but in 
its interface with the corporeal world.  Like the Internet before it, 
the blockchain is subject to regulation from governments around the 
world.298  This Article provides a first attempt to think through how 
the law can, and cannot, work upon the blockchain. 
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